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THE FIRST TRUE CASE OF 'LEED®-IGATION':
THE FAR-REACHING IMPACT OF GIFFORD V. UNITED
STATES GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL
Colin W. Maguire
I. Introduction
On August 16, 2011, a decision was handed down by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York in the case
of Gifford v. United States Green Building Council.1 The case had been
closely watched by numerous organizations within the green building
and legal communities in part because of the prevalence of the
United States Green Building Council's (USGBC) Leadership in En-
ergy and Environmental Design@ (LEED@) Certification System.'
The case was ultimately dismissed for two overriding reasons: (1)
Henry Gifford lacked standing to sue USGBC as a class representative
or an individual to file the suit and (2) Mr. Gifford failed to state a
claim on which relief could be granted.' In some ways, this was a vic-
tory for USGBC and green building certifications everywhere, but the
decision did not completely ameliorate the threat of litigation con-
cerning USGBC or other green building professionals.' Therefore, it
is necessary to assess the explicit and implicit ramifications of the is-
sues and reasoning surrounding Gifford v. United States Green Building
Council: the first real example of "full-blown 'LEEDigation' which has
generally remained elusive."'
1. Gifford v. USGBC, No. 10 Civ. 7747, 2011 WL 4343815 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16,
2011).
2. See, e.g., James Stewart & Robbie J. Vargo, Gifford v. USGBC: LEED Certifica-
tion Challenged, 11 MEALEY's LITIGATION REPORT: CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS,
Jan. 2011, at 20, available at http://www.lowenstein.com/publications/arti-
cles/List.aspx?view=rest; Tim Clayton, Amended Complaint Filed in Gifford v.
USGBC, OHIO GREEN BLDG. L. (Apr. 4, 2011), http://ohiogreenbuilding
law.com/2011/04/04/amended-complaint-filed-in-gifford-v-usgbc/; Shari
Shapiro, Gifford Files Amended Complaint in Gifford v. USGBC Which May Lead
to Discovery from USGBC, GREEN BLDG. L. BLOG (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.
greenbuildinglawblog.com/2011/02/articles/litigation/gifford-files-
amended-complaint-in-gifford-v-usgbc-which-may-lead-to-discovery-from-
usgbc/.
3. Gifford, 201 IWL 4343815, at *3-4; Adam J. Sulkowski, From the Environment,
40 REAL EsT. LJ. 49, 412-13(2011) (discussing the holding in Gifford v.
USGBC).
4. Sulkowski, supra note 3, at 414.
5. Cf Stephen Del Percio, The Top 5 Stories in Green Real Estate Law: 2011,
GREEN REAL EST. L.J. BLOG (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.greenrealestatelaw.
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With the growth of competition in the green building market, and a
better public understanding of green building knowledge, various le-
gal concerns should be considered concerning LEED@ or any other
pervasive green building industry presence.' There are specific issues
that Gifford v. USGBC should bring to the legal world's attention. First,
a plaintiff with proper standing to sue USGBC under the Lanham Act
would fare much better because the court did not say that USGBC was
not violating federal anti-trust law by making the claims litigated,
though a different approach may be needed to prove the elements of
standing. Second, it is plausible that a direct competitor of USGBC
may have fared better with a modified Sherman Antitrust Act suit, de-
spite the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. Third, the ambiguity in Gifford
forces us to consider what type of legal relationship exists between
USGBC and LEED@ Accredited Professionals (APs). This is always an
important factor when assessing any potential future litigation. Finally,
situations like this can, and should, be avoided by green building cer-
tification companies because exterior pressures to prove return on in-
vestment do not outweigh the downfalls of proffering false claims.
This analysis does not explore every possibility arising from Gifford but
does offer a far easier path to proving the types of claims Mr. Gifford
wanted to assert. What can be stated with certainty is that Mr. Gifford's
sharp critique of USGBC's claims has shown a chink in USGBC's legal
armor.7
II. Background
The Environmental Protection Agency defines the practice of green
building as "the practice of creating structures and using processes
that are environmentally responsible and resource-efficient through-
out a building's life-cycle from siting to design, construction, opera-
tion, maintenance, renovation and deconstruction. This practice
expands and complements the classical building design concerns of
economy, utility, durability, and comfort."' Henry Gifford is the
founder of EnergySavingScience.com; he researches building energy
com/2012/01/the-top-5-stories-in-green-real-estate-law-2011/ (stating that
"full-blown 'LEEDigation' [has] remained elusive").
6. See Colin W. Maguire, The Imposing Specter of Municipal Liability for Exclusive
Promotion of Private Green Building Certifications, 1 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV.
157, 157-60 (2012).
7. To fully disclose my position, I used to be a full-time employee of SERF(Society of Environmentally Responsible Facilities) and I still occasionally
contract with this company. SERF is an alternative certification to LEED
and you can read information about the company at www.SERFgreen.org.
Gifford is an important case for everyone involved with the green building
community; but, for reasons that are apparent from the holding, Gifford is
an especially relevant result to competitors of USGBC.
8. Maguire, supra note 6, at 158 (quoting Basic Information on Green Build-
ing, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/greenbuilding/pubs/
about.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2012)).
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efficiency and green building practices while operating as a consultant
on energy efficiency in buildings, most notably apartment buildings.'
Mr. Gifford, on his own and through Gifford Fuel Savings, Inc., is "a
consultant who provides advice about how to reduce energy costs[.]"' 0
As proponents of LEED@ have contemptuously, though correctly,
pointed out, Mr. Gifford did not purchase USGBC products or work
on LEED@ certified properties."
LEED@ is USGBC's principal product: a designation for buildings
that comply with certain standards.12 The growth of LEED@ and the
USGBC has been a true success story, with many thousands of LEED@
APs and LEED@ certified buildings around the world." LEED@ certi-
fied buildings assess aspects of "(1) site planning; (2) water manage-
ment; (3) energy management; (4) material use; (5) indoor
environmental air quality; and (6) innovation & design progress."1
LEED@ certification does not necessarily purport to assess actual
environmental impacts of buildings, but rather looks to tangible de-
sign elements to infer sustainable qualities in a building's construc-
tion and performance. Still, a 2008 study sponsored and promoted
by USGBC found that LEED@ certified buildings were 25-30% more
energy-efficient than non-LEED@ certified buildings." It was claims
related to this study supported by USGBC that were the cause of Mr.
Gifford's legal actions.' 7
A. Mr. Gifford Attempts Class Action Suit against USGBC, but Settled for
Suing USGBC as an Individual with Co-Plaintiffs.
Initially, Mr. Gifford attempted to certify himself as a class-represen-
tative of a class for those injured by USGBC's claims.'" First, Mr. Gif-
ford claimed that USGBC's public assertions violated the Sherman
9. ENERGYSAVINGSCIENCE.COM, http://www.energysavingscience.com/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 8, 2012).
10. Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 8, Gifford v. USGBC,
No. 10 Civ. 7747, 2011 WL 4343815 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2011), 2011 WL
1302413.
11. E.g., Tim Clayton, Gifford v. USGBC Part I: Revenge is a Dish Best Served in
Federal District Court (aka "The Complete Idiot's Guide to Suing Your Way to More
Speaking Engagements."), OHIo GREEN BLDG. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2010), http://
ohiogreenbuildinglaw.com/2010/10/29/gifford-v-usgbc-part-i-revenge-is-a-
dish-best-served-in-federal-district-court-aka-%e2%80%9cthe-complete-idiot
%e2%80%99s-guide-to-suing-your-way-to-more-speaking-engagements-%e2
%80%9d/.
12. Maguire, supra note 6, at 158; USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/ (last visited
January 11, 2012).
13. Maguire, supra note 6, at 158.
14. Id.
15. See Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *1 (citing Defense Motion to Dismiss at 5).
16. Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 7.
17. Id. at 1.
18. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 4, Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, 2010
WL 4087620.
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Anti-Trust Act" by monopolization through fraud.2 0 Second, Mr. Gif-
ford claimed that USGBC's public assertions violated the Lanham
Act2' by promoting unfair competition. Finally, Mr. Gifford claimed
that USGBC's public assertions violated similar New York state statutes
(which included a Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization
(RICO)" claim) and a claim of unjust enrichment.24
Before the Court ruled on the class certification, the complaint was
amended to list Mr. Gifford, Gifford Fuel Savings, Inc., Mr. Matthew
Arnold, Mr. Andrew Ask, and Ms. Elisa Larkin as plaintiffs; aban-
doning the request for a class certification. 2 Additionally, the claims
were limited to claims under the Lanham Act for false advertising26
and similar New York state statutes,27 again, based upon USGBC's as-
sertions through promotion of their 2008 study.28 Finally, Mr. Gifford
cited various common law claims concerning unfair competition.2 1
Notably, Mr. Gifford sought injunctive relief to correct literature ex-
tolling USGBC's allegedly inaccurate claims and to publicly disclose
the actual total of utility bills for LEED@ certified buildings; Mr. Gif-
ford also sought actual, treble damages for loss of his business as a
competitor.so
District Judge Sand reasoned that the standard under USGBC's
Rule 12(b) (6)3" motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which
relief may be granted should be read in such a way to accept the fac-
tual elements set forth by Mr. Gifford as true. 2 However, the Court
also reasoned that the complaint needed to be persuasive to survive
the summary judgment motion by USGBC and a mere recitation of
the facts would not be acceptable; rather, the complaint needed to be
19. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C § 2 (2006).
20. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 18, at 4.
21. Lanham Act § 43(a) (1) (B), 15 U.S.C § 1125(a) (1) (B) (2006).
22. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 18, at 14-17.
23. RICO Act § 901(a), 18 U.S.C § 1961 (2006).
24. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 18, at 22-23.
25. Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 3-4.
26. 15 U.S.C § 1125(a)(1)(B).
27. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 349(a), (h), 350(a), (e) (McKinney Supp. 2011).
28. Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 14-16.
29. Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 16.
30. Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 16.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6).
32. Gifford v. USGBC, No. 10 Civ. 7747, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
16, 2011); see McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d
Cir. 2007).
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"plausible on its face."" Further, the Court reasoned that their analy-
sis was "not limited to the four corners of the complaint. . ..
B. The Court Logically, Though Without a Close Assessment of LEED@,
Reasoned That Gifford had no Standing Under the Lanham Act.
In assessing the potential Lanham Act violations by USGBC, the
Court reasoned the proper test to use3 1 was a two-part test to deter-
mine the most basic precept of a Lanham Act violation: that the claim-
ant is a competitor of the alleged violator." Under the Court's
prescribed standing test for a Lanham Act violation, Mr. Gifford
needed to "'demonstrate (1) a reasonable interest to be protected
against the alleged false advertising, and (2) a reasonable basis for
believing that the interest is likely to be damaged by the false advertis-
ing.""' The Court also reasoned that because Mr. Gifford's service
was not in direct competition with USGBC's service (LEED®), Mr.
Gifford needed to establish a "'more substantial showing of injury"' to
satisfy the second prong of the Lanham Act standing test."
The Court held that Mr. Gifford could not satisfy either prong of
the standing test." The Court reasoned that Mr. Gifford did not com-
pete with USGBC in the green building certification industry or, in
what Mr. Gifford referred to as, the "market for energy efficient build-
ing expertise."40 The Court specifically found that Mr. Gifford and
33. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2 ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a com-
plaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)))).
34. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2; Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d
142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993).
35. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2 (discussing the broad language of the Lan-
ham Act which requires that "any person who, on or in connection with any
goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word,
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which . . . in commercial advertising or
promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geo-
graphic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commer-
cial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act" (quoting 15 U.S.C
§ 1125(a) (1) (B))).
36. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2; Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc.,
624 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir 2010) ("[T]o have standing for a Lanham Act
false advertising claim, the plaintiff must be a competitor of the defendant
and allege a competitive injury." (quoting Telecom Int'l Am., Inc. v. AT&T
Corp., 280 F.3d 175, 197 (2d Cir. 2001))).
37. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2 (quoting Famous Horse, 624 F.3d at 113).
38. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2 (quoting Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cos-
prophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1994)).
39. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3.
40. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3 (citing Plaintiffs Opposition Motion to
Dismiss at 5).
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USGBC were in different business, similar to an earlier case out of the
Southern District of New York wherein a foundation which gave finan-
cial support to alcoholism rehabilitation services sued a non-affiliated
alcoholism rehabilitation services provider under similar Lanham Act
claims." In that case, it was found that a company offering alcoholism
counseling was far different from a company awarding money to com-
panies offering alcoholism counseling. 2 In a similar way, the Court
found Mr. Gifford performed energy-efficiency assessments but
USGBC only promoted energy-efficiency assessments. 43
Before the formal analysis of this case begins, it is important to show
that such reasoning by the Court is suspect. Taking a moment to ex-
plain why is an advisable step to take because it is instructive as to
USGBC's business model. It is true that USGBC publishes forms of
their LEED@ certification criteria on their website for the world to see
(essentially offering free advice on energy-efficiency) .44 The Court
also correctly observes that one does not have to be a LEED@ AP to
perform work on a LEED® certified building." However, USGBC has
an entirely different business position than that of the type of founda-
tion referenced by the Court in the alcoholism counseling services
case.46 USGBC provides information and study materials to individu-
als wishing to obtain LEED@ AP status and further their knowledge of
green building systems;4 these individuals will subsequently pay fees
and take an examination through the Green Building Certification
Institute (GBCI).8 Similarly, though USGBC creates the LEED@
guidelines, it is GBCI who handles the actual LEED@ application re-
view and certification process. 9 There is no dispute in Gifford that
GBCI is a direct arm of USGBC's operations and so assistance in com-
plying with a green building standard could be considered a form of
advisement on energy-efficiency.o Also, USGBC themselves charge as
41. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3 (citing Smithers Found., Inc. v. St. Luke's-
Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., No. 00 Civ. 5502, 2001 WL 761076, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
July 6, 2001)).
42. Smithers, 2001 WL 761076, at *5.
43. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3.
44. E.g., LEED 2009 FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND MAJOR RENOVATION, USGBC
(2009 Updated July 2012), http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?Docu-
mentlD=8868.
45. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3.
46. Id. (citing Smithers, 2001 WL 761076, at *5).
47. See LEED Professional Credentials, USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/Display
Page.aspx?CMSPagelD=1815 (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
48. GREEN BUILDING CERTIFICATION INSTITUTE, http://www.gbci.org/home
page.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
49. See Building Certification, GREEN BUILDING CERTIFICATION INSTITUTE, http://
www.gbci.org/main-nav/building-certification/certification-guide.aspx
(last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
50. Cf Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *1.
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much as $270.00, for LEED@ reference guides" and consulting with a
LEED® AP (who is certified through the USGBC's sub-unit GBCI)
can cost as much as $600-$2000.00, or more.52
To be clear, there is nothing wrong with USGBC taking steps to
ensure the stability and quality of their LEED® products by requiring
the individuals representing them to become trained and familiar
with their product. Yet, when this green building certification product
is sold to the public, and instructions as to its use are available for a
monetary fee, it is difficult to reconcile these facts with the idea that
"USGBC does not provide clients with advice about energy efficient
design. . ."" (unless there is some sort of admission that LEED@
guidelines do not lead to energy efficient buildings). This is not to
suggest that Mr. Gifford has a valid claim. After all, the Court astutely
noted that Mr. Gifford was unable to establish any sort of causal nexus
between an incident in which his services were passed over for a
LEED@ AP's services by developer Steve Bluestone and the allegedly
fraudulent study supported by USGBC." Rather, Mr. Bluestone con-
tended that he chose the LEED@ AP " 'because everyone has heard of
LEED, but not everyone has heard of Henry Gifford[.]' "" The Court
dismissed the Lanham Act cause of action for lack of standing and
dismissed Mr. Gifford's state law claims for the same reason.56 Still,
Mr. Gifford probably is a competitor of USGBC on some level, even if
the Court did find such reasoning persuasive. Again, the Court cor-
rectly dismissed the claim with prejudice;57 but if the exclusion of one
is the inclusion of all others, then the Court did specifically point to
the fact that a company which actually certifies green buildings would
be able to navigate the standing issues in Lanham with a far greater
ease.5 8
III. Analysis
The opinion granting a motion to dismiss to USGBC is not long,
but it is dense and impactful. The most important aspect of Judge
Sand's opinion, going forward, is what it fails to say: that Henry Gif-
ford is wrong about USGBC proffering a fraudulent advertising
51. Publication Pricing, USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CM-
SPagelD=1983 (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
52. LEED Consulting: How Much Does It Cost?, LEED BLOGGER (Feb. 19, 2009),
http://leedblogger.com/2009/02/19/leed-consulting-how-much-does-it-
cost/.
53. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3.
54. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3-4 (applying a causal nexus requirement
between the alleged false advertising and the alleged injury as part of the
'reasonable basis' prong of the Lanham Act standing test (citing ITC Ltd.
V. Punchgni, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 170 (2d Cir. 2007))).
55. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *4.
56. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *4.
57. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *4.
58. See Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3.
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claim." As an independent assessment of Mr. Gifford's written re-
sponse to USGBC's 2008 published study stated:
After analyzing the data collected by NBI, however, Henry
Gifford, a widely respected energy consultant and boiler ex-
pert from New York City, reached a dramatically different
conclusion. His analysis amounts to a stinging indictment of
the statistical procedures used to determine the perform-
ance of LEED-certified buildings. In "A Better Way [t] o Rate
Green Buildings," a paper posted on Gifford's Web site, Gif-
ford contends that "The LEED system has changed the mar-
ket for environmentally friendly buildings in the US, but
there is an enormous problem: the best data available shows
that on average, they use more energy than comparable
buildings. What has been created is the image of energy-effi-
cient buildings, but not actual energy efficiency.6 0
Mr. Gifford's arguments do make a degree of logical sense, even to
the untrained researcher. For instance, only LEED@ certified build-
ing owners who volunteered for the study were considered; the build-
ings volunteered were far more contemporary in age than the
sampling they were compared to; and the comparison between the
buildings may simply have been overstated because the researchers
chose to use the mean values for older buildings and the median val-
ues for LEED@ buildings (two values which, by definition, measure
separate aspects of a grouping)."
To be fair, problems concerning a building's energy efficiency are
not USGBC specific. Buildings and their construction constitute a real
environmental problem; especially considering buildings directly ac-
count for up to 40% on our nation's energy consumption." As federal
and state governments consider regulations to make buildings more
energy efficient, other research is beginning to agree with Mr. Gif-
ford's general proposition: our buildings are still using as much en-
ergy as they did 20-30 years ago.6" The problem is simple enough:
requiring 'green' and/or energy-efficient components in a system
does not mean those components will work together in that same sys-
tem.6 Mr. Gifford's concerns address these issues directly by looking
59. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3.
60. Assessing the Performance of LEED Buildings, ENERGY DESIGN UPDATE, Oct.
2008, at 1 (quoting HENRY GIFFORD, A BETTER WAY TO RATE GREEN BUILD-
INGS, ENERGYSAVINGSSCIENCE.COM (2008), available at http://www.energy
savingscience.com/articles/henrysarticles).
61. HENRY GIFFORD, A BETTER WAY To RATE GREEN BUILDINGS, ENERGYSAVINGSS-
CIENCE.COM (2008), available at http://www.energysavingscience.com/arti-
cles/henrysarticles.
62. Seth Jaffe, Does Energy Efficient Technology Make Buildings More Energy Efficient?
The Answer May Not Be So Obvious, LAw & THE ENVIRONMENT (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://www.lawandenvironment.com/.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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at problems like air-leakage that are not addressed by USGBC yet may
be more prevalent if a green building system called, as an example,
for more windows than your average building to maximize natural
light.15 Again, such problems may be prevalent in green buildings
across the country, but that is not what Mr. Gifford was arguing.
Rather, the question the court would have appropriately considered,
with standing, was whether USGBC's claims were damaging to a com-
petitor." The general concept that USGBC may be promoting things
about their product that are untrue is a dangerous one for USGBC
and other green building certification systems because it leads down
the ugly legal path of unfair competition and anti-trust litigation.
A. If USGBC is Falsely Representing their Product, Then Competitors may be
Able to Prove the Causal Nexus Requirement for Standing Under the Lan-
ham Act.
Recall that the first element required for standing under the Lan-
ham Act is that the plaintiff actually be a competitor.6 ' Recall also that
the Court in Gifford reasoned the second element requires a causal
nexus be established between the alleged damaging advertising and
some actual damage." The Court aptly reasoned that proving this sec-
ond element will be difficult because some people are familiar with
LEED® and no other certifications. In assessing why this might be
so, it is important to look to the root of LEED@ 's ascendance and
explore an even larger issue with LEED@ that Mr. Gifford did not, or
could not, explore.
Assume for a moment that the fictitious ACME Green Building Cer-
tifications, Inc. (ACME) runs a business directly certifying green
buildings. ACME wants to certify a few buildings in Suburbia, North
Carolina. Unfortunately, ACME is unable to certify any buildings in
Suburbia, despite some initial positive conversations. So ACME asks
you, their corporate counsel, to do research and see if there is some
type of government program promoting energy-efficiency or green
buildings which ACME can use to help increase customer interest in
Suburbia, North Carolina. What you find surprises you. As early as
2005, Ms. Alicia Ravetto (a LEED@ Fellow)70 was testifying in front the
North Carolina Utilities Commission about the benefits of LEED@
65. See Assessing the Performance of LEED Buildings, supra note 60, at 2-3.
66. See Gifford v. USGBC, No. 10 Civ. 7747, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 16, 2011).
67. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2.
68. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3-4 (applying a causal nexus requirement
between the alleged false advertising and the alleged injury as part of the
'reasonable basis' prong of the Lanham Act standing test (citing ITC Ltd.
V. Punchgni, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 170 (2d Cir. 2007))).
69. See Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *34.
70. Alicia Ravatto LEED Fellow, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/in/
aliciaravettoarchitect (last visited Dec. 29 2012).
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certified buildings while citing figures" which you may question, in
light of Gifford, but which were adopted as findings of fact by the
North Carolina Utilities Commission.7 2
Now you are curious as to the extent to which LEED@ may or may
not have been advocated to government entities around the State of
North Carolina. It turns out that ACME's prospective client was look-
ing for municipal funding because the client was attempting to con-
vert a former sawmill, designated as a brownfield site,7 into a mixed-
use commercial center. The costs of the environmental clean-up and
adaptive reuse of the older building were such that the prospective
client felt such municipal funding was necessary. So, you look into the
municipal funding program and find an ordinance entitled
"[e]nvironmental requirements for city funded construction"; this
seems like great news for ACME, until you read the following:
The purpose of this ordinance is to promote development
consistent with sound environmental practices by requiring,
subject to [relevant code section], that applicable building
projects constructed with City construction funds obtain, at a
minimum: (1) "Silver" for City owned and operated build-
ings, or (2) "Certified" for private building projects that re-
ceive City funds. These designations shall be from the
United States Green Building Council ("USGBC") as defined
herein. 74
You are shocked, but your surprise begins to wear when you read
that a member of the Town of Suburbia, North Carolina Town Coun-
cil is a LEED® AP. As if this whole hypothetical analysis is not strange
enough, you begin to wonder if the State of North Carolina has em-
powered local units of government to exclusively require LEED@, or
any other private green building systems, as part of an incentive pack-
age. If this were true, you might have a devastating report for ACME's
executives. You then find a state statute on point, which states:
(i) In order to encourage construction that uses sustaina-
ble design principles and to improve energy efficiency in
71. In re Integrated Resource Planning - 2005, 251 P.U.R. 4th (Public Utilities
Reports) 469, 488-89 (N.C. Utilities Comm'n Aug. 31, 2006) (advocating
for green building systems designs, specifically LEED@, and their ability to
create energy efficient buildings that can "save up to 75% of the energy
used for electric lighting in a building").
72. Id. at 485.
73. Brownfields Definition, EPA, http://epa.gov/brownfields/overview/glossary.
htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) ("The term 'brownfield site' means real
property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be compli-
cated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pol-
lutant, or contaminant.").
74. IC THOMAS A. MATTHEWS & BYRON S. MATTHEWS, MATTHEWS MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCEs § 37:65(1) (4th ed. 2010).
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buildings, a county may charge reduced building permit fees
or provide partial rebates of building permit fees for build-
ings that are constructed or renovated using design princi-
ples that conform to or exceed one or more of the following
certifications or ratings:
(1) Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
(LEED) certification or higher rating under certification
standards adopted by the U.S. Green Building Council.
(2) A One Globe or higher rating under the Green Globes
program standards adopted by the Green Building Initiative.
(3) A certification or rating by another nationally recog-
nized certification or rating system that is equivalent or
greater than those listed in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this
subsection."
The North Carolina Legislature's plain-meaning and intent seems
to indicate that local units of government may only enact programs
like the one the Town of Suburbia is using if the choice of green
building standards is non-exclusive. Failing to do so probably puts the
Town of Suburbia in violation of state law and in violation of the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause" (though not the Equal Protection Clause
because of section 3 of the ordinance)." If ACME feels wronged in
this hypothetical analysis, they may have easy recourse against the mu-
nicipality, but what about USGBC, and how would this situation relate
to Gzfford?
This situation could create the type of situation that produces the
causal nexus of the second element needed under the Lanham Act to
have standing. It is not too hard to prove that the fictitious ACME, a
certifier of green buildings, is a direct competitor of USGBC per the
first element of the standing test." Still, it is a more nuanced analysis
to consider the second element in this scenario. From a distance, it
seems difficult to imagine that the Town of Suburbia created their
ordinance with intent to harm anyone; rather, they probably wanted
to promote green building practices. However, intent does not matter
in terms of standing under the Lanham Act (much less the municipal-
ity's intent) and a hypothetical suit by ACME must specifically "
'demonstrate (1) a reasonable interest to be protected against the al-
leged false advertising, and (2) a reasonable basis for believing that
the interest is likely to be damaged by the false advertising.' "9 Fur-
ther, we now know that a claim subject to a motion to dismiss must be
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340(i) (2011).
76. See, e.g, Maguire, supra note 6, at 172.
77. MATTHEWS, supra note 74, at § 37:65(3).
78. Gifford v. USGBC, No. 10 Civ. 7477, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
16, 2011).
79. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2 (quoting Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave.
Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2010)).
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considered by a trier of fact as " 'plausible on its face' "s0 while "not
[being] limited to the four corners of the complaint. . .."'I
Again, the second element remains provable but probably rests on
the answers to very important questions, which could assess if such a
claim is plausible, such as: (1) were members of the Town Council
made aware of any statistics proffered by USGBC when they voted to
adopt their LEED@-exclusive ordinance; (2) were representatives of
USGBC present and did they make claims about the efficiency stan-
dards of LEED@; and (3) did anyone say that LEED@ was the 'best',
'most viable', or 'only' green building certification system?" Such a
line of inquiry is not as situation-specific as one might think. Perhaps
in reliance on USGBC studies, numerous cities across the country
have adopted LEED@-specific building standards." LEED@ specific
programs may be found in many states." If USGBC misstated the ef-
fectiveness of LEED®, then it is very plausible to imagine a situation
in which a city promoted LEED@ as a result of falsely-presented infor-
mation which led to the preference of a LEED® purchase over a com-
petitor's service. After all, the stated purpose for adopting or buying a
LEED@ certification is likely to address " ' (1) site planning; (2) water
management; (3) energy management; (4) material use; (5) indoor
environmental air quality; and (6) innovation & design progress.' "84
It follows that the aforementioned six purposes encompass the ratio-
nale for a municipality adopting LEED® standards. Assuming one or
more of those six purposes are misstated, a municipality adopting a
LEED@-exclusive standard must have relied on false information in
coming to its decision. If a competitor of USGBC uses the same or
similar criteria, then misstating the effectiveness of measures based
upon those criteria propped up the quality of USGBC's service, while
80. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2 ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a com-
plaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)))).
81. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2.
82. Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential
for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REv. 669, 704 & n. 160
(2010) (discussing LEED® legislation in various cities and quoting a
USGBC study stating: "[b]uilding green is one of the best strategies for
meeting the challenge of climate change because the technology to make
substantial reductions in energy and C02 emissions already exists. The av-
erage LEED@ certified building uses 32% less electricity and saves 350 met-
ric tons of C02 emissions annually." quoting Press Release, U.S. Green
Bldg. Council, Building Design Leaders Collaborating on Carbon-Neutral
Buildings by 2030: Goal to Meet Specific Energy Reduction Targets (May 7,
2007), http://www.usgbc.org/News/PressReleaseDetails.aspx?ID=3124)).
83. Les Lo Baugh, LEED(R) Green Building Incentives, in GREEN REAL ESTATE
SurMIT 2008, at 39 (PLI Real Estate Law and Practice, Course Handbook
Ser. No. 556, 2008).
84. Maguire, supra note 6, at 158 (quoting USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/
(last visited Feb. 15, 2012)).
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simultaneously downgrading the quality of a competitor's service. This
would be a probable outcome because a municipality adopting
LEED®-exclusive legislation would have erroneously given the
LEED@ certification more credit than it deserved and not rejected the
LEED@ certification as an exclusive standard or considered other cer-
tifications as seriously as they might have if accurate information had
been advertised.
Currently, USGBC publicly relies on numbers consistent with those
in question during their suit with Mr. Gifford.15 One might think that,
in the wake of Gifford, USGBC would shy away from using specific
figures to promote their product. Instead, USGBC offers a compre-
hensive online kit complete with attractive and informative literature,
charts, and even a press release to assist those who wish to make
LEED@ the law." Part of this website includes an explanation of
USGBC's Building Performance Partnership (BPP), a program that
tacitly acknowledges that the energy-efficiency of a building needs to
be measured individually. Therefore, owners of LEED@ certified
buildings must submit energy use data to USGBC so that both parties
can benefit from actual energy bench-marking." This is a responsible
approach to energy-efficiency measurements in green buildings espe-
cially considering that USGBC stated, on the record, in Gifford that
LEED@ certification does not guarantee benefits like energy-effi-
ciency." Yet, USGBC still encourages government units to adopt
LEED@ standards, possibly as a requirement, using information from
a 2011 study of 22 buildings conducted by the U.S. Department of
Energy which indicates that LEED@ certified buildings "[cionsume
25% less energy and 11% less water . . . [h]ave 19% lower mainte-
nance costs; 27% higher occupancy satisfaction; [and] 34% lower
greenhouse gas emissions.""
Specifically, the energy efficiency number used in USGBC's fact
sheet is consistent with the study indicating LEED® buildings were 25-
30% more energy-efficient than other buildings that Mr. Gifford
based his suit on.9 o Problems similar to the ones cited by Mr. Gifford
exist in these specific numbers as well. First, the study was actually
conducted by the General Services Administration (GSA) for 22 GSA
85. USGBC, GREEN BUILDING FACTS (2012), http://new.usgbc.org/sites/de-
fault/files/Docs18693.pdf; GSA PUB. BLDG. SERv., GREEN BUILDING PER-
FORMANCE: A POST OccUPANcY EVALUATION OF 22 BUILDINGS 2 (Aug. 2011),
http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/pbs/GreenBuildingPerformance.pdf.
86. Fact Sheets & Policy BHriefs, USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?
CMSPagelD=2501 (last visited Dec. 29, 2012).
87. USGBC, ENERGY PERFORMANCE IN THE LEED RATING SYSTEM (2011), http://
new.usgbc.org/sites/default/files/PolBrief EnergyPerfinLEED.pdf.
88. See Gifford v. USGBC, No. 10 Civ. 7747, 2011 WL 4343815, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 16, 2011) (citing Defense Motion to Dismiss at 5).
89. USGBC, supra note 85.
90. See Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 7.
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buildings; only 16 of the buildings were LEED@ Certified.' Assuming
the GSA did not overstate the efficiency of their buildings, their base-
line point of comparison for their buildings was a study published in
2003 by the Department of Energy based upon a voluntary survey.9 2
Therefore, USGBC is campaigning for government adoption of
LEED@ with numbers that are: 1) based on a sample group of build-
ings which include 27% non-LEED@ certified buildings, 2) based
upon comparisons from figures that are almost 10 years old, and 3)
provided by a third party that spent money LEED@ certifying 16
buildings and now finds itself having to justify its spending habits in
front of Congress."
If USGBC continues to rely on suspect figures in advertising, then it
stands to reason they continue to open themselves up to attacks by
quasi-competitors like Mr. Gifford and direct competitors. The
USGBC's specific use of questionable figures to induce government
adoption of LEED standards is the kind of direct casual nexus for
standing under the Lanham Act that Mr. Gifford could not prove."
Beyond the scope of a green building's energy-efficiency analysis, an
interested party could investigate the fact that USGBC also promotes a
study which claims that "LEED buildings avoided 0.35% of total U.S.
C02 emissions in 2011."" The percentage of C02 avoidance attrib-
uted to LEED buildings is estimated to be 4.92% in 2030.""96 There
remain numerous unexplored claims and issues involving the Lanham
Act and the types of adverting claims Mr. Gifford took issue with. In
the context of the right kind of cause of action, (probably a situation
in which a unit of government has exclusively adopted the LEED@
standards) a true competitor of USGBC has a sound basis for making
a prima facie case and, at least, gaining standing under the Lanham
Act.
91. GSA PUB. BLDG. SERV., supra note 85, at 2-3.
92. See id.; DEPT. OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, 2003 COMMERCIAL BUILDING
ENERGY CONSUMPTION SURVEY (Oct. 2008), http://www.eia.gov/emeu/
cbecs/cbecs2003/detailedtables_2003/2003setl9/2003pdf/alltables.pdf.
93. E.g., Ed O'Keefe, House to Vote to Prevent GSA-like Spending, 2cHAMBERs BLOG
(Apr. 25, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2cham-
bers/post/house-to-vote-to-prevent-gsa-like-spending/2012/04/24/gQAv
WyLfThblog.html.
94. Gifford v. USGBC, No. 10 Civ. 7477, 2011WL 4343815, at *3-4 (Aug. 16,
2011 S.D.N.Y) (applying a causal nexus requirement between the alleged
false advertising and the alleged injury as part of the 'reasonable basis'
prong of the Lanham Act standing test (citing ITC Ltd. V. Punchgni, Inc.,
482 F.3d 135, 170 (2d Cir. 2007))).
95. GREEN BUILDING FACTS, supra note 85, at 1.
96. Id.; ROB WATSON, GREEN BUILDING MARKET AND IMPACT REPORT: 2011,
GREENBIz GRP., INC., 30-33 (2011), http://www.greenbiz.com/sites/all/
themes/greenbiz/doc/GBMIR2011 .pdf.
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B. If the Basic Elements of a Lanham Act Claim Could be Proven by a Com-
petitor Based Upon Exclusive Government Adoption of the LEED@ Stan-
dard, Then a Sherman Antitrust Act Claim Could Also be Successful.
Mr. Gifford chose to drop his claim under the Sherman Antitrust
Act Sec. 2, when he amended his complaint." This is likely because
Mr. Gifford was not a competitor of USGBC in the most literal sense,98
so it would be difficult for him to prove a conspiracy by USGBC to
monopolize an industry USGBC was only marginally involved in -
building energy-efficiency." Still, Mr. Gifford never considered
whether or not his business had been affected by a municipal code
adopting LEED@ because a municipality may have relied upon false
information from USGBC (perhaps he had no reason to because no
such code exists where he did business). If this had been considered,
Mr. Gifford may have found a wealth of case law.'
The problem with antitrust actions involving government influence
is that they will have to pass muster under the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine.'o' This doctrine involves a principal laid out in both Eastern Rail-
road Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight' 2 and United Mine Workers of
America v. Pennington.0 s The case law antitrust immunization goes
something like this: if a person or group sought to go into the market-
place and set prices, this would be considered a violation of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act because this is a direct attempt to injure a
competitor in a private marketplace. 104 However, the Supreme Court
has reasoned that it is not so clear that if a group collectively advocates
and negotiates a restraint on the marketplace that the effect of that
advocacy falls within the Sherman Antitrust Act. 0 5 This idea was di-
rectly considered in the context of lobbying activity in Allied Tube and
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., when the Supreme Court reasoned
that ". . .where, independent of any government action, the anticom-
petitive restraint results directly from private action, the restraint can-
not form the basis for antitrust liability if it is 'incidental' to a valid
effort to influence governmental action."'O
97. Cf Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 8-11.
98. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3.
99. See Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C § 2 (2006).
100. See, e.g., Louis ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 1 CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION TRADE AND MONOPOLY § 3:8 (4th ed. 2011); see also, e.g., WILLIAM C.
HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAw HANDBOOK § 8:8 (2011-
2012 ed. 2011).
101. See HOLMES, supra note 100, at § 8:8.
102. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961).
103. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
104. See, e.g., Pennington, 381 U.S. at 663.
105. E.g., id. at 664.
106. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 (1988)
(quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 143 (1961)).
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In Allied Tube, the Supreme Court did cast a more suspicious eye on
lobbying efforts in the context of administrative or judicial proceed-
ings, like the ones that might be found at a level of state agencies or
municipal government. 0 7 The Court reasoned that conduct which is
closer to private business communication, and less like an open legis-
lative process, would be presumed to not enjoy Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine protection'o However, this well-reasoned doctrine was refined
to the point of requiring rhetorical gymnastics in City of Columbia v.
Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.'0 9 The Court has long recognized the
previously stated exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine known as
the "sham exception" because "[t]here may be situations in which a
publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing govern-
mental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more
than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of
a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justi-
fied."110 The new wrinkle that Omni adds is that only activities that
directly interfere with a governments decision-making can be consid-
ered a sham (and not subject to Noerr-Pennington immunity) and not
the government activity itself because the government is an indepen-
dent decision maker; in other words, lobbying but not the effect of a
passed law is actionable under the Sherman Antitrust Act."'
This seems like poison to many claims under Sherman and gives
wealthy entities the ability to craft legislation at their leisure. This in-
terpretation of Noerr-Pennington immunity is not without a variety of
detractors ranging from Robert Bork to the Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association."' Still, would this prohibition on a claim
against those who successfully influence a government measure be fa-
tal to the hypothetical discussed in this section? To recap, let us as-
107. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499; California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Un-
limited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972).
108. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 507 ("[Activities tending to enjoy immunity from
antitrust litigation] 'bear[s] little if any resemblance to the combinations
normally held violative of the Sherman Act. . .' " (quoting Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136
(1961))).
109. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380
(1991).
110. Omni, 499 U.S. at 380 (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. No-
err Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)).
111. Omni, 499 U.S. at 380-81.
112. See Timothy J. Murisa, Clarifying the State Action and Noerr Exemptions, 27
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 443, 444 (2004) (" ' [P]rofusion of such govern-
mental authority offers almost limitless possibilities for abuse' " (quoting
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
347 (1978))); id. ("[A]ntitrust 'immunity drives a large hole in the frame-
work of a nation's competition laws'" (quoting SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw,
Am. BAR Ass'N, THE STATE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT-2001, at 42
(2001), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
antitrustlaw/reportantitrustenforcement.authcheckdam.pdf)).
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sume a true competitor of USGBC sought a Lanham Act claim and a
Sherman section 2 claim under the exact same cause of action: that
USGBC produced false advertising claims, which helped lead to the
passage of LEED@-exclusive statutes or ordinances. Would the second
claim be barred under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine? In a rare excep-
tion, the answer is probably 'no' in part because the plausibility stan-
dard of a claim "concerns the viability of an inference,"' 1 3 and this
inference must have a plausible starting point.
The Sherman claim in this scenario is, at least, provable because
one of two legal propositions must be true. First, a violation of section
2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, for lobbying with false information
about your product, is subject to the same standard as disseminating
false information about your product through the submission of false
advertising that leads to the passage of the municipal code.1 14 In the
alternative, these claims are two completely separate issues and would
be confined to the mere promotion of a business in the case of Sher-
man and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine (because the doctrine clearly
distinguishes between a claim under the process of making an anti-
competitive law and a claim under the effect of the anti-competitive
law itself), while a suit under the Lanham Act must consider the effect
of such false claims generally 1 5 and as part of the causal nexus analy-
sis for standing. For if any claim must be "plausible on its face," must
not a court provide for a plausible application of the law governing
that claim?'
113. Nicholas Tymokzko, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining Plausibility
Standard After Bell v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REv. 505, 532
(2009).
114. Gifford v. USGBC, No. 10 Civ. 7747, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
16, 2011) (quoting Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106,
112 (2d Cir. 2010) (" ' [T]o have standing for a Lanham Act false advertis-
ing claim, the plaintiff must be a competitor of the defendant and allege a
competitive injury.' " (quoting Telecom Int'l Am., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 280
F.3d 175, 197 (2d Cir. 2001)))).
115. Gifford v. USGBC, No. 10 Civ. 7747, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2 (quoting Fa-
mous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2010)).
116. Admittedly, this is an evolving area of the law that requires a particularized
analysis, but it rationally follows a general discussion of the plausibility stan-
dard's application to this hypothetical analysis because plausibility requires
a rational and mutually exclusive connection between applicable law and a
rational claim. See Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *2 (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a com-
plaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face." quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))); see, e.g., Tymokzko, supra note 113, at
511 ("Determining whether a claim is plausible is a 'context-specific task'
requiring the exercise of 'judicial experience and common sense' " (quot-
ing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)))).
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USGBC's studies would only have been useful at the preliminary
lobbying stage.' 1 7 USGBC does not, necessarily, have to be in direct
contact with a governing body because they "represent 140,000 design
professionals whom [USGBC] has accredited as qualified to advise
real estate professionals and consumers on how to design a LEED@-
certified building.""' Therefore, a potentially misleading promo-
tional study by USGBC, laid in the hands of an aggressive LEED@ AP
seeking exclusive statutory promotion of LEED®, has the ability to
directly damage USGBC's competitors in the marketplace in violation
of the Lanham Act"' and in the eyes of a legislature or administrative
body in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.12 0 Especially in rela-
tion to the latter violation, what purpose would a study that is damag-
ing to a competitor of USGBC's have in the hands of a LEED@ AP
other than to promote that LEED@ AP and USGBC's products at-
large?12 1
C. USGBC Claims That it Represents all LEED@ APs, Though the Relation-
ship Would Seem to go in the Opposite Direction.
In Gifford, the Court notes that USGBC "represents approximately
140,000 design professionals whom it has accredited as qualified to
advise real estate developers and other consumers on how to design a
LEED-certified building. USGBC receives fees from parties seeking
LEED certification for their buildings and from the individual profes-
sionals it accredits."12 2 Therefore, some kind of relationship exists be-
tween USGBC and LEED@. From the description given, the
relationship sounds like one between an agent and a principal. Still,
which side would be the agent and which the principal? If the rela-
tionship is not an agency, is it a franchisor-franchisee relationship or
an independent contractor situation? The idea of representation may
infer agency and so we should consider what the Court may implicitly
be saying.
As International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, possibly the most fa-
mous case involving corporations and agency in our jurisprudence,
states: " [s] ince the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction
intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact. . ., it is clear that
unlike an individual its 'presence' without, as well as within, the state
of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf
117. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380-81
(1991).
118. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *1.
119. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *3-4 (applying a causal nexus requirement
between the alleged false advertising and the alleged injury as part of the
'reasonable basis' prong of the Lanham Act standing test (citing ITC Ltd.
V. Punchgni, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 170 (2d Cir. 2007))).
120. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 380-81.
121. See, e.g., id.
122. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *1.
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by those who are authorized to act for it."' 23 The power of agency is
an old one in our jurisprudence and it involves the power to affect the
legal position of a principal. 1 24 It is the authority of the agent to act
for the benefit of the principal that established the relationship. 125
Most importantly, the source of the power of agency must not be the
agent but the principal. 126
Still, the existence of any type of agency will not be presumed in
most jurisdictions.'2 7 Rather, the plaintiff in a potential lawsuit must
establish agency by a showing of substantial evidence.128 So is there
some sort of agency relationship between USGBC and LEED@ APs?
That would be impossible to say without a very close examination of
documents between the two parties, but the basic query of who bene-
fits who in this relationship is still an open question. We know that
USGBC "accredits" LEED@ APs through GBCI and that LEED@ APs
are "qualified to advise real estate developers and other consumers on
how to design a LEED-certified building." 2 9 We also know that build-
ings gets credit for using a LEED@ AP on a building's LEED@ certifi-
cation process. 3 o It is probably safe to assume that many LEED@
projects employ at least one LEED@ AP. Therefore, it seems like the
LEED® AP is in the position of benefitting from their relationship
with USGBC. A more direct resolution to the issue would only be
achieved by looking at contracts or other writings between the parties.
D. Green Building Certification Companies Should be Very Careful When
Presenting Marketing Claims.
Legal advisors to green building certification companies must be on
alert at all times to remember their company's true mission. Consider
USGBC's claim that LEED@ "does not assess the actual environmental
performance of any structure for which certification is sought or
granted.""' That seems appropriate because it may be very difficult to
scientifically assess the actual environmental impact of a building, in
123. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316-7 (1945) (citation omitted).
124. 3 AMER. JUR. 2D Agency § 68 (3d ed. 2002) (citing Wen Kroy Realty Co. v.
Public Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 183 N.E. 73, 74 (N.Y. 1932)).
125. Id. (citing Fuller v. Fasig-Tipton Co., 587 F.2d 103, 106-7 (2d Cir. 1978)).
126. Id. (citing Alar v. Mercy Mem'l Hosp., 529 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995)).
127. 3 C.J.S. Agency § 509 (2011) (citing John W. Lohr Funeral Home, Inc. v.
Hess & Eisenhardt Co., 166 S.E.2d 141, 146 (W. Va. 1969)).
128. Id. (citing Lincoln Log Home Enter., Inc. v. Autrey, 836 So. 2d 804, 806
(Ala. 2002)).
129. Gifford v. USGBC, No. 10 Civ. 7747, 2011 WL 4343815, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
16, 2011).
130. LEED 2009 FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND MAJOR RENOVATION, supra note
44, at 86.
131. Gifford, 2011 WL 4343815, at *1 (citing Defense Motion to Dismiss at 5).
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part, because the definition of sustainability can vary. 13 2 So why com-
mission a sloppy statistical analysis of a building's energy efficiency,
which Mr. Gifford ripped apart with the type of logical ease one asso-
ciates with a preparatory school science teacher correcting their stu-
dent on scientific method?"' Green building professionals3 4
certainly understand the demands of a marketplace where the cus-
tomer wants a concrete answer to questions regarding investment and
efficiency.
This makes sense because executives and leaders in various fields
are feeling personal pressure to show direct financial gain as a result
of sustainability measures.1 35 In fact, a global survey of 642 leaders in
various fields found that 88% of respondents felt exactly this type of
pressure to prove short-term return on investment when considering
sustainability methods. 3 6 Still, green building certification providers
should not necessarily feel any kind of pressure to show return on
investment, especially because this pressure is often marginally greater
from internal sources than from the most important external source:
the consumer.1 3 7
Another recent survey of thousands of executives in over 100 coun-
tries found that around 66% of executives felt sustainability was a nec-
essary part of being competitive within consumer markets, while
around 31% found they had directly profited from sustainable prac-
tices. 138 Those numbers may mean that the average consumer is un-
concerned with a company's green policy particulars, but may be
satisfied with that company's efforts to be more sustainable. In terms
of green buildings, operators may generally enjoy the advantages de-
rived from an energy-efficient building, such as better protection
against rising energy costs, the ability to lease due to lower energy
costs, and a marketing bonus to potential users who are environmen-
132. See Tristan Roberts, Green Manufacturers Examine Their Impacts, GREEN-
SOURCE, July-Aug. 2011, at 42, 44-45.
133. See Assessing the Performance of LEED Buildings, supra note 60, at 1 (quoting
HENRY GIFFORD, A BETTER WAY TO RATE GREEN BUILDINGS, ENERGYSAVINGSS-
CIENCE.COM (2008), available at http://www.energysavingscience.com/arti-
cles/henrysarticles).
134. A group which I count myself a part of.
135. Experts Polled for UN-Backed Research Name Short-Termism as Biggest Barrier to
Green Transition, BUSINEssGREEN (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.business
green.com/bg/news/2141908/survey-profit-incentive-derailing-sustainabil-
ity?WT.rss f=Home&WT.rssa=Survey%3A+Profit+incentive+derailing+
sustainability.
136. Id.
137. See R.P. Siegel, Does Sustainability Increase Profits?, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Jan. 30,
2012), http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/01/sustainability-increase-prof-
its/.
138. Id. (citing KNUTE HANNAES ET AL., SUSTAINABILTY NEARS A TIPPING POINT,
MIT SLOAN: MANAGEMENT REVIEw (Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://
sloanreview.mit.edu/feature/sustainability-strategy/?utm-source=release&
utmmedium=pr&utm-campaign=sustl2).
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tally conscientious." ' Those advantages assume that such claims of
energy-efficiency are accurate, the very problem in Gifford, and reflect
a larger problem with marketing proliferated through rapid sources
like the Internet.
It is a basic legal truth that competitors and consumers are paying
closer attention to the content of Internet advertisement, while look-
ing for ways to poke holes in a company's claims.14 0 For instance, com-
panies like New Balance, Reebok, General Mills, and Yoplait USA,
Inc., have all recently been sued based upon Internet ads.14' The Fed-
eral Trade Commission is also coming down on various companies
who market acai berries on the Internet.'4 2 So while it may be worth
commissioning studies to assess how energy-efficient a building is,
studies can be subjective and it would be advisable to use conservative
figures when touting a product's benefits on the internet." Alterna-
tively, a client might consider focusing product advertising in differ-
ent directions. For instance, if consumers demand sustainability, then
help point the client towards the sustainable aspects of a green build-
ing through marketing efforts.' 4 4 There are also various government
standards and research available which are federally funded, well-
respected, and can provide a point of reference for energy-
efficiency.'
IV. Conclusion
In Gifford, USGBC is attacked, essentially, for promoting themselves.
It is possible, and Mr. Gifford's analysis is not without its merits, that
USGBC is promoting the LEED@ standard in a dishonest way. Still,
self-promotion is what we expect businesses to do. The real problem
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Know, 2 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT'L BANK. & FIN. L. 99, 100 (2012).
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TION OF LITIGATION (Nov. 3, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litiga-
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_SERF Cooley.AuburnHillsCaseStudyFINALWebl.pdf (describing a
building which had followed certain LEED® specifications but which had
not been LEED@ certified; the main idea of the piece is to extoll the sus-
tainable aspects of the building in a way that an average building user can
understand). To disclose, I was the principal author of this piece but
worked closely with all the institutions involved in this marketing piece.
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lies in municipal requirement of LEED@ and its imposition on the
consumer and the marketplace.1 4 6 It may not be a just policy that
USGBC or its representatives may argue for these statutory measures,
but Mr. Gifford has stumbled onto a great legal weapon for competi-
tors of USGBC. For if every LEED@ exclusive statute was passed based
upon false information furnished by USGBC, then the liability of
USGBC may be far-reaching.
There are many issues left to consider. First, state law claims related
to the activity liti ated in Gifford may vary as to their application and
probable result.14 Second, to what extent might true competitors be
able to establish a class-action lawsuit against USGBC? Third, would a
consumer class-action suit against USGBC be more effective and plau-
sible? Fourth and finally, to what extent is USGBC on the Federal
Trade Commission's radar and, if not, does this have anything to do
with the federal government deciding to use LEED@ on their
buildings?14
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L.J. 299, 309-10 (2010).
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